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Abstract
This paper serves three purposes. First, it gives a short introduction to the concept of sustainability in 
relation to land use. Since the Brundtland report it has become clear that sustainability is a dynamic 
concept that changes when conditions in society change. Moreover, it is easier to assess what is 
‘unsustainable’ than what is ‘sustainable’. But that will not suppress the demand for sustainable 
developments. Second, it elucidates a classification of different concepts developed within New 
Institutional Economics and applies these concepts to a number of typical problem areas in relation to 
land ownership and land use. Institutions change slowly and that holds most for informal rules, which 
are classified by Williamson as ‘social embeddedness’. Land ownership and land use often function partly 
under informal rules. But formal rules and institutional arrangements are also crucial: together with the 
informal rules they go here under the name ‘institutional setting’. Because the landowner − or the present 
user of land − is often not the best user from the perspective of the society, the relationship between 
‘owner’ and ‘user’ has raised a lot of attention. Efficient exchange at the land rental market, but also 
contracts that are adjusted to the characteristics of owners and renters or to the specifics of multifunctional 
land use contribute to sustainable land use. Third, this paper provides the connection between the different 
papers of this special issue and shows where they fit into the basic theoretical framework. Most attention 
goes to ownership (including property rights), the land rental market and contract choice. Different 
functions of land use, however, are also covered with a clear link to informal rules.
Additional keywords: institutional change, land ownership, land rental market, multifunctional land use, 
property rights
Introduction
Land has always been an intriguing production factor, in economics as well as in many 
other scientific areas. It is remarkable how different scientific disciplines – but also 
different groups in society – have studied land during the course of time. To take only 
one early perspective in economics: ‘physiocrats’ and ‘georgists’ considered land as the 
only production factor that would generate value (i.e., surplus above production costs) 
and could therefore be taxed. Such insights have changed; value creation takes place by 
different processes and by any resource, whether physical, human, social or cultural. 
Still, land is important for production, location of activities, landscape, biodiversity, 
living space, and hence wealth in societies. In many societies, land ownership or 
permanent use rights contribute to social security and status.
 Sustainability is a more recent concept. Since the Brundtland report (Anon., 1987) 
sustainability has drawn a lot of attention in the scientific community and also in 
society. In this report, sustainability is described as “the ability of Humanity (....) to 
ensure that it meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. This makes it essentially a 
dynamic and uncertain concept, where needs of present generations and uncertain 
or unknown needs of future generations have to be balanced. Moreover, it is easier to 
characterize what is ‘unsustainable’ than what is ‘sustainable’. It is possible to identify 
an ‘unsustainable’ development by comparing it with a development possessing more 
preferred characteristics: to define one is already sufficient. ‘Sustainable’ also requires 
such a comparison – but then with a bunch of less preferred alternatives. Three aspects 
of ‘unsustainability’ come to the fore: ecological, economic, and social. They are often 
called the three dimensions of sustainability. Each has in fact its own dimensions 
and bringing them together in one framework – together with man-made capital 
– requires the valuation of ecological and social capital by economic standards (Pearce 
& Atkinson, 1995; Pezzey, 1997). This is a typical economics solution, which is not 
always accepted by other disciplines, which do not appreciate the integration of the 
different dimensions into one valuation concept. 
 Many books and articles have been dedicated to unsustainable land use caused by 
erosion, salinity, depletion of minerals, and pollution, but also by reducing the natural 
biodiversity or spoiling the landscape. One cannot deny that these are mainly aspects 
of ecologically unsustainable developments. They capture the attention. But economic 
and social conditions play an equally important role because if land use generates 
no income or if nobody cares about cultural landscapes – due to a lack of people or a 
social infrastructure – then irreversible and unintended developments (from a societal 
perspective) take place at the cost of future generations, and such developments are 
characterized as unsustainable. Still, society is demanding sustainable developments. 
Moreover, it is useful to observe that unsustainable land use like severe erosion (e.g., 
the Badlands in South Dakota) or digging out peat and creating lakes (e.g., in the 
Netherlands) can be highly valuable if tourism becomes more important than agriculture. 
So under different conditions a previously unsustainable development can become very 
attractive. This is another illustration that sustainability is a dynamic concept. 
 In literature, less attention has been given to institutional causes of unsustainable 
land use.  Here we consider institutions as general characteristics of societies, which 
have a much wider relevance than simply with respect to land use. Institutions are 
defined as the informal and formal rules that govern societies. Institutions change 
slowly, which implies that when conditions are changing, the institutions are often not 
in line with the new conditions. It is crucial for institutions to fit present and future 
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needs of society under the (then) ruling ecological conditions.
 A special issue like this one cannot cover the whole area of sustainable land use 
in relation to institutional settings. We are limited to the size of such an issue and the 
new papers available. Still, we tried to have a rather wide perspective with contributions 
focusing on western Europe, eastern Europe, North America (USA), South America 
(Peru), and Asia (China). This represents a very wide range of institutional settings 
(geographically and institutionally). 
 Good theoretical and empirical approaches to institutions of land use can be found 
in Hayami & Otsuka (1993), Otsuka & Place (2001), Allen & Lueck (2003), and Otsuka 
(2007). This special issue contributes to the available literature by presenting new 
approaches and results. This paper gives the framework for positioning the results of 
this ongoing and widening area of scientific research. 
Institutions and sustainable land use
Institutions in relation to land use
Although the word ‘institutions’ is well known, its definition is often problematic. As 
can be imagined, institutions are defined in different ways. According to North (1991), 
institutions are “the humanly devised constraints that structure policy, economic 
and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws and 
property rights)”. Over time, people have developed institutions in order to create order 
and regularity. 
 As indicated by North (1991), rules can be formal and informal and this led 
Williamson (2000) to distinguishing informal and formal rules (see Table 1). The 
informal rules (= social embeddedness) are most consistent, because they belong to the 
common knowledge and habit formation of people and are often passed down from one 
generation to the next: informal land use rights are typical examples in the literature. If 
informal rules allow existing footpaths over land, then ownership rights are restricted. 
The same applies with respect to groundwater under the land: informal (or formal) 
rights to use that water affect opportunities of land use.
 Another distinction within institutions that deserves attention is the difference 
between the institutional environment (which are the formal rules of a society) and 
the institutional arrangements (also known as governance structures). Institutional 
arrangements or governance structures rule the co-ordination mechanisms (Slangen et 
al., 2008) that are crucial for the way in which processes take place in society. Let us
provide a typical example in relation to land use. If both land ownership and land 
tenancy are allowed, then the way contracts are arranged between landowners and 
tenants is called an institutional arrangement or governance structure. Several 
such arrangements exist: markets, contracts, vertical integration (which implies full 
co-ordination within a hierarchy) and a whole range of hybrids between markets 
and hierarchies. Each of them has its own characteristics, and it depends on the 
institutional environment which of them functions best. Williamson (2000) considers 
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institutional arrangements as more flexible than the institutional environment. 
Governance structures often develop in a more incremental way.
 Given the presence of informal rules with respect to land use, it is virtually impossible 
to apply a governance structure (= institutional arrangement) that is contrary to basic 
informal rules. Moreover, changing formal rules of society (e.g., concerning land ownership 
or lease regulation) often takes many years. This implies that social embeddedness and 
the institutional environment are determining factors for the institutional arrangements. 
There is also a feedback effect of particular institutional arrangements being allowed 
via laws and regulations. If governance structures seem to function quite well then they 
influence the institutional environment (e.g., by being included in the law) and gradually 
also social embeddedness: the informal rules. We summarize a typical combination of 
social embeddedness (Table 1, level I), institutional environment (level II) and governance 
structure (level III) with the name ‘institutional setting’.
 Institutional settings lead to the actual resource allocation and exchange processes 
that take place in society (level IV). It is the subject area covered by e.g. neoclassical 
economics: resource use, the exchange of goods and services, price formation, income 
generation, and investment decisions. Neoclassical economics suggests that inefficient 
institutions are rapidly replaced by more efficient institutions (North, 1994). This idea, 
however, is challenged by New Institutional Economics. Still it is useful to realize that the 
results of processes at level IV influence again the institutional setting (Sterman, 2000). 
 It is obvious that when there is no water available, it will be difficult to irrigate 
land. But it seems to be more difficult to grasp the idea that certain types of land use are 
unsustainable if property rights are not clearly defined and if embeddedness in societies 
will not occur. For social scientists, however, that is or becomes increasingly obvious.
Table 1. Four levels of structuring human decision-making with an application to land.
Level Time horizon Core elements Examples in relation to land use
 (years)
I. Social 100–1000 Informal rules of society, Whether land property is
embeddedness  traditions, norms, religion. acknowledged; whether individual
   or common property rights hold;
   whether civilians have access to land.
II. Institutional  10–100 Formal rules in the Land property rights; inheritance;
environment  constitution, laws, formal land tenure law; enforcement
  organization of society. of laws and regulations.
III. Institutional 1–10 Governance structures Land markets; rental markets;
arrangements  that rule processes and land redistribution; contracts
  provide co-ordination. for the provision of landscape and nature.
IV. Resource Continuous Choice of input and Selling or buying land; renting and 
allocation  output levels by agents. leasing  land; crop choice;
   fertilization. 
Source: Partly based on Williamson (2000).
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Elaborating institutional settings and their effect on sustainable land use
Institutions are very important for sustainable land use. Here we summarize land use 
under two stylized patterns of institutional settings that are typical for a low and a high level 
of development (Table 2). Of course, such patterns could be further detailed or adapted.
 Table 2 could be extended, but shows clearly that the institutional setting also 
determines the relevance of particular types of institutions. In the following we 
elaborate on each of the items in Table 2.
Ownership, use, and transfer of rights 
From the perspective of societies it is a key issue that land is owned or used by those 
who can contribute most to the development of society. Land ownership and land use 
are two different concepts. The user right is a right emanating from the bundle of 
property rights of ownership (Slangen et al., 2008). Ownership is most fundamental, 
and land use rights are derived from the bundle of property rights that characterize 
ownership. Under institutional settings where (almost) permanent user rights exist, 
land use rights play a more important role and ownership functions in the background. 
Land use rights can be transferred (partly) from owners to users. It is also possible to 
transfer user rights fully or partly from one user to the other. Transfers can be done via 
markets, but also via enforcement by law and/or by governmental organizations. 
 Land ownership has many variations, ranging from private ownership to state 
ownership, or community ownership and no-ownership (Slangen et al., 2008). Private 
ownership is generally the most desirable institution for sustainable land use because it 
ties together the residual control and residual returns, provides individual landowners 
with economic incentives to work hard and improve land value, and eventually 
generates socially efficient outcomes (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). However, sustainable 
land use may not be achieved when individual land use produces negative externalities 
and private ownership creates social inequity. 
 Individual land rights are restricted under community ownership. User rights are 
shared – often on the basis of informal rules. Tenure security and transfer rights of 
land are usually restricted by the informal rules in the community (Otsuka & Place, 
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Table 2. Land use under two stylized institutional settings.
Item Low level of development High level of development
Ownership rights Incomplete and partly based on Clearly described, but often 
 informal arrangements. restricted by general rules of society.
Land rental market Often poorly functioning; goes Rental markets, which are sometimes
 by informal rules of communities adjusted to the need of specialized
 and (limited) formal rules. contracts.
Contract choice Relatively more sharecropping. Mainly cash rent.
Different functions  Agricultural production-oriented / Market oriented and sometimes
of land use partly self-subsistence. multifunctional land use.
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2001). Individual land rights under state ownership are even more restricted unless the 
state grants clear property rights to individuals (Otsuka & Place, 2001). For sustainable 
land use it will be important that the landowner or user cares about keeping the land 
in good condition and preparing it for future use. Investment in soil fertility, but also 
keeping up irrigation systems and other infrastructure (e.g., those that control erosion) 
are essential for the future productivity of land. From an institutional perspective 
this is often guaranteed if tenure security exists. This provides a security level that 
allows investment demand and the provision of credit. Under such conditions the 
current land user is assured of the revenues of current investments and future land 
use (Besley, 1995). But implementing secure user rights counteracts allocating land to 
the most efficient user, and hence to long-term sustainability effects. One observes an 
interesting trade-off here. 
Land rental market
Markets are the key economic mechanisms for efficient resource allocation and 
economic growth. Under institutional settings where imperfections exist in markets for 
credit and insurance (low level of development, specified in Table 2), transfers of land 
use rights usually take place through the land rental market. For sustainable land use it 
will be desirable for the land to be transferred from less productive to more productive 
producers. Equalizing the marginal product of land across producers with different 
land–labour endowments is essential for efficient and equitable land allocation and 
for productivity growth in agriculture. From an institutional perspective this is often 
guaranteed if free land transfer rights are provided (Carter & Yao, 1999).
Contract choice between landowner and tenant
The relationship between landowner (or the one who leases land) and the tenant has 
been one of the popular items in research. Many articles start from a principal-agent 
approach (Huffman & Just, 2004). Crucial assumptions are related to asymmetric 
information between owner and renter: they have access to different information. 
This makes it difficult for the landowner to select the best renter: this is often called 
the ‘adverse selection problem’. But if the renter has been selected, then the problem 
arises of providing the ‘right’ incentives to keep land in good condition: often called the 
‘moral hazard problem’. 
 Given that farming depends on weather and market conditions, there is a lot of 
uncertainty involved in these two problems, and the risk-averseness of owner and 
renter may also differ. This leads to an interesting set of opportunities, where the 
optimal selection of the renter and the elements of the contract depend not only on 
individual characteristics of owner and renter but also on the opportunities to transfer 
risks to insurance markets or to share risk between owner and renter (sharecropping). 
From such a theoretical framework it is possible to derive the consequences of 
monitoring and enforceability costs, and differences in risk attitude and risk perception. 
It is also possible to explain the dominance of share tenancy under the institutional 
settings of developing countries (e.g., Otsuka & Hayami, 1988; Otsuka et al., 1992; 
Huffman & Just, 2004) whereas fixed cash rent is the main contract in circumstances 
where renters have less risk, are relatively difficult to monitor, or have relatively large 
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farms and high wealth levels (Huffman & Fukunaga, 2008). This has also been 
mentioned in Table 2. Some researchers also provide theoretical explanations as to why 
in sharecropping contracts a 50–50 sharing is widely observed in spite of tenant and 
landowner heterogeneity (Otsuka et al., 1992: 1969; Huffman & Just, 2004).
 As discussed previously, for sustainable land use it will be good that the landowners 
cultivate the land (owner–operators); or the land users enjoy long-term tenure 
security (e.g., permanent land users). In the case of fixed cash rent (cash-renters) or 
sharecropping (tenant–operators), the tenants do not enjoy long-term tenure security. 
Therefore, the incentives for land-related investments and sustainable land use may 
be weaker with fixed cash rent and sharecropping than with land ownership. However, 
long-term share tenancy based on personal trust gives the tenant strong incentives 
for land-attached investments and the landowner is involved in production decision-
making so that he can incorporate his long-term interests in agricultural production. 
So the incentives for sustainable land use may be stronger with share tenancy than 
with fixed cash rent. The standard principal-agent approach assumes that it is possible 
to conclude complete contracts. 
Different functions of land use and the related contracting
Under the institutional settings of developed countries, different functions of land 
use become increasingly important (e.g., Pedroli et al., 2007; Jongeneel et al., 2008). 
Multifunctional land use means that land use can simultaneously fulfil different 
combinations of functions, including the traditional production function (food, feed, 
fuel), an ecological function (habitat for wildlife), a cultural function (typical landscapes) 
and a recreational function (enjoying landscape, on-farm attractions and accommodation) 
(Jongeneel et al., 2008). This raises the question as to what institutions can best govern 
processes of multifunctional land use and develop solutions for sustainable land use. 
 In practice one can observe that contracting, either of processes or outputs, is 
gaining in importance. Contracting landscape services might be easier under full 
ownership of land. Full ownership implies that the decision-maker not only receives 
the revenue from the services provided, but also experiences the change in value due 
to multifunctional land use. Moreover, it prevents a possible costly monitoring process 
of the relationship between land use and land value. Also the results of investment 
in knowledge and reputation building in different directions come into the hands of 
the one who is investing. MacLeod (2003) shows that if contracts are renewable and 
multi-tasking is important, subjective evaluations – and hence incomplete contracts 
based on reputation – are frequently better than objective evaluations and very specific 
contracts. Such insights can be used in designing contracts for farming in combination 
with green services. The flexibility created within an incomplete contract approach is 
contrary to the rigidity of a principal-agent approach.  
How the set of papers deals with sustainable land use 
under different institutional settings
The first paper takes a broad perspective in the number of countries and looks first at 
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the institutional environment. The change of formal rules implies a shift from state 
and co-operative ownership of farms to more individual farm ownership and land 
use. The paper quantifies the influence of a change of institutional environment on 
agricultural productivity growth (Rizov, 2008; this issue). This is done for one of the 
very interesting ‘laboratories’ of institutional reform: the former communist countries 
in East Europe. Just because the institutional environment changed quickly in these 
countries, but at different speeds, the relationship between agricultural productivity 
growth and the institutional environment can be tested quite well by means of a 
comparative analysis. The paper builds on earlier papers (Rizov, 2005; Lerman & 
Shagaida, 2007), but is now focused much more on institutional aspects. Rizov 
(2008; this issue) shows the importance of the institutional environment, but also of 
the institutional arrangements in achieving efficient, and consequently also a more 
sustainable agriculture. In countries where institutional reforms were implemented 
more quickly and/or were further-reaching, the productivity growth was faster, thereby 
contributing to sustainable land use.
 Land titling programmes are generally considered as an important institutional 
reform for enhancing farmer’s incentives to make land-attached investments and 
to promote sustainable land use. Based on empirical data collected in 2004 from 
2230 farmers distributed over five different regional domains in the coastal and 
Andean Regions of Peru, Fort (2008; this issue) investigates the effect of land titling 
programmes, mainly concentrating on the formalization of previous informal land 
rights, and on land-attached investments. He shows the importance of land titling 
programmes on the propensity to invest. On parcels with previously low levels of 
tenure security, the land-attached investment is higher, which often – and particularly 
in developing countries – implies a more sustainable land use.
 The development of land rental and labour markets plays a very important role in 
increasing household investment incentives and increasing allocative efficiency and 
agricultural productivity (Deininger & Jin, 2005). Earlier literature on land and labour 
market development and agricultural production in rural China has focused on either 
the land or the labour market. However, empirical evidence shows that economic 
reforms in rural China have led to the emergence of land and labour markets. The 
increasing importance of these two markets suggests that they might be closely inter-
related. Based on the data from a household survey held in 2000 in three villages in 
the northeast of the Jiangxi Province, Feng & Heerink (2008; this issue) examine the 
factors that determine the participation of farm households in land rental markets and 
off-farm employment, and investigate whether participation in land rental markets and 
off-farm employment influence each other.
 Building on Feng & Heerink (2008; this issue), the paper of Feng (2008; this 
issue) goes one step further to investigate the technical efficiency in rice production 
and examines the effect of land rental market participation, the resulting land tenure 
contracts, and off-farm employment on technical efficiency in rural China. The analysis 
is based on a household and plot level survey held in 2000, 2001 and 2003 in three 
villages in the northeast of the Jiangxi Province. Feng (2008; this issue) shows the 
importance of land rental market participation on technical efficiency. Most plots used 
by farmers are the so-called contracted plots distributed directly by the village collective. 
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Contracted plots experience high tenure security. Rented plots have less tenure 
security, but the farmers who rent land might be more efficient. Empirical analysis 
shows that rented plots are technically as efficient as contracted plots, which shows that 
the two opposing effects compensate each other. Therefore the development of a land 
rental market contributes significantly to sustainable agricultural production and hence 
land use in rural China. 
 Cash rent and sharecropping normally co-exist under different institutional settings. 
As discussed in the foregoing, sharecropping is dominant in developing countries 
because the risk is shared between landowner and renter. But even in developed 
countries with less risky processes, e.g., in the USA, sharecropping still accounts for one-
quarter of all leases (Huffman & Fukunaga, 2008; this issue). Earlier articles ignored 
the landlord’s attributes as determinants of choosing either a cash rent contract or a 
sharecropping contract. Both Huffman & Fukunaga (2008; this issue) and Fukunaga & 
Huffman (2008) use a uniquely constructed data set of 44,515 landlord-tenant contracts 
to examine the effect of risk-related factors, transaction cost factors, and landlord’s and 
tenant’s attributes on landlord−tenant contract choice. This implies that quantitative 
results are available to determine the effects of variables that are typical of an institutional 
economics approach. Huffman & Fukunaga (2008; this issue) show the importance of 
sharecropping for sustainable land use, compared with cash rent. 
 Where Huffman & Fukunaga (2008; this issue) are focusing on landlord−tenant 
attributes and a limited number of different contracts, Slangen & Polman (2008; this 
issue) focus on different sets of property rights that are transferred from owners to 
tenants. Characteristics of owners and tenants do not receive special attention, but 
the type of contractual agreement plays an important role. The empirical analysis 
is directed at the perspective of the landowner. What is the value of the bundle of 
property rights transferred to the tenant? Empirical results confirm that the value of 
lease contracts for the landowners depends on the content of the bundle of property 
rights: the more control rights for the landowner, the less protection for the tenant, the 
shorter the duration of the contract, the higher the flexibility of the contract, the higher 
the level of property rights transferability, and the higher the value of the bundle of 
property rights for the landowner. The bundle of property rights transferred within a 
lease transaction varies with the type of contractual arrangement (Slangen & Polman, 
2008; this issue).
 Institutional design of agri-environmental contracts is a rather new phenomenon 
in the European Union. It is a step towards a more environmentally friendly way of 
farming. Earlier articles focused on the role of the farm and farmer characteristics 
as determinants of taking up agri-environmental schemes. Also Polman & Slangen 
(2008; this issue) include these characteristics in their analysis, but their focus is more 
on the institutional design and the role of trust and social capital in taking up agri-
environmental schemes. The analysis is based on empirical data from an EU project 
comprising responses from 990 farmers in different EU countries. The data and 
the empirical analysis provide excellent opportunities to compare the importance of 
institutional settings in relation to multifunctional land use.
 Positioning of the different papers in the categorization provided in Tables 1 and 2 
shows clearly that a range of institutional settings and actual resource use is covered, 
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for all the items that play a prominent role in land ownership and land use (Table 3). 
Most work, however, is concentrated on institutional arrangements (= governance 
structures) and on the ownership rights and the land rental market. ‘contract choice’’ 
and ’different functions of land use’ are also present. Those items will become more 
important in developed market economies where green services in rural areas will 
receive more attention (see e.g., Diakosavvas, 2004; Anon., 2008), while transition and 
developing countries will follow. Multifunctional land use is much more demanding 
with respect to institutional settings.
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